

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

25X1

20 February 1964

Copy No. 25X1

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



25X1

State Department, DIA reviews completed

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500200001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500200001-6

20 February 1964

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS


1. Cyprus: Lull in fighting threatened in western Cyprus. (Page 1)
2. Gabon: Military coup nullified by French intervention. (Page 3)

25X1

4. South Vietnam: Viet Cong apparently intend to intensify terrorism against Americans. (Page 5)
5. South Vietnam: Viet Cong morale high and Communists believe victory near. (Page 6)
6. Cuba - UN Trade Conference: Cuba to play role of champion of underdeveloped countries. (Page 7)
7. Notes:  Cambodia; West Germany - Ceylon; Bolivia; Chile; Dominican Republic. (Page 8)

25X1

# Cyprus



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

20 February 1964

### DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: The most immediate threat to the three-day lull on Cyprus comes from the western area near Kokkina.

25X1

The British peace-keeping force has been unsuccessful in getting the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the Kokkina area to give up their positions or agree to a formal cease-fire. Scattered incidents continue elsewhere.

The Greek Cypriot press continues its violent anti-American, anti-British, and anti-NATO campaign. It also expresses firm conviction that the Greek Cypriots can count on the support of the USSR, Egypt, and the Afro-Asian bloc.

[The US Army Attaché in Nicosia reports a belief is developing among Greek Cypriots, even within]

[Makarios' inner circle, that the threat of intervention by Turkey is a bluff. They tend to disregard such statements as that of the Turkish information minister on 18 February, that if the Security Council were unable to find a Cyprus solution, the Turks would eventually be "forced to intervene."]

[Air activity at the Incirlik air base in southern Turkey continues to increase. Large quantities of ammunition are being moved to the flight line and more planes have appeared at the base than have been noticed in recent days. There are, however, no signs of increased activity by the Turkish Army or Navy in the Iskenderun-Mersin area.]

In New York, Cypriot Foreign Minister Kyprianou apparently is becoming convinced that there is little chance of obtaining a Security Council resolution calling simply for respect of Cyprus' territorial integrity and condemning aggression against the island. His government has not, however, been willing to accept the U Thant proposals as an alternative.

In the likelihood that the Greek Cypriots will not get all that they want at the UN, there is some danger of their reacting violently against the Turkish Cypriots and possibly against US and UK interests. The local Communists would stand to make considerable gains in such circumstances.

Britain yesterday announced that it was flying an additional 1,500 to 1,600 troops to Cyprus starting today. This is one of the largest increments since the fighting started in December.

25X1

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

2

25X1



25X1

25X1

\*Gabon: France has intervened in Gabon in an effort to check the political upheaval touched off by the ouster of President Mba on 18 February.

French troops which occupied key points in Libreville--in the face of some resistance--yesterday in effect nullified the earlier military coup. They have reportedly liberated all the ministers of the Mba government and are in control of the situation.

Official sources in Paris reportedly labeled the coup a "military rebellion of limited character" and proclaimed the French Government's recognition of Mba as the legal head of the Gabon Government. Mba's apparent inability to rely on his own security forces, however, suggests that he may now be forced to negotiate with the rebels who overthrew him.

There are indications that the French may be negotiating with Jean Aubame--Mba's political rival whom the rebels named to head a provisional government. Any such negotiations presumably are aimed at reaching agreement on a government which would include both Mba and Aubame.

25X1



25X1

Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500200001-6

Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500200001-6

South Vietnam: The Viet Cong apparently intend to intensify terrorism against Americans, whom Communist propaganda identifies as the main enemy of the Vietnamese people.

The US consul in Hué has noted that Viet Cong propaganda in the northern provinces seems centered increasingly around anti-American themes. Several Vietnamese sources in one northern city have reported that the war is widely considered an American, not a Vietnamese, war.

A communiqué issued on 18 February by the Viet Cong's political arm, the Liberation Front, implied that American troops are being singled out as targets of violence. The communiqué warned foreign and South Vietnamese nationals, including government troops, to avoid all contact with Americans. Restaurants, clubs, and billets frequented by US troops are to be specifically avoided.

Since the 31 January coup, 15 bomb or grenade incidents directed toward US personnel have occurred. This is the highest rate of such attacks to date. Ten of these have occurred in Saigon, and the US chargé reports that the morale of the American community has been noticeably affected.

In at least two recent incidents, Vietnamese appear to have been forewarned and stayed away from the areas involved and did not warn Americans.

The stepped-up terrorism campaign appears designed to shake public morale and to undermine American confidence in the ability of the new government.

25X1

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

5

25X1  
25X1  
South Vietnam: Viet Cong morale is "very high,"  
and the Communists believe victory to be near, ac-

[redacted]  
[redacted] reported that the Viet Cong  
are well armed, equipped with modern communica-  
tions gear, and able to concentrate into a regimental  
formation rapidly. Their food position is much im-  
proved over that of a year ago.

The chargé, in relaying the information to a US  
Embassy official, added his view that the South Viet-  
namese are war weary and really care only about an  
end to the fighting. He believes that a neutralist coup  
could come at any time and would be genuinely popular.

The chargé advised that the West should have no  
illusion about winning either a military or political  
victory, but should use its military presence in South  
Vietnam for maximum bargaining leverage to obtain  
an internationally guaranteed "peace" agreement.

25X1  
He acknowledged that such an arrangement might  
lead to a Communist takeover, but claimed that the  
area would remain relatively Western oriented, with  
France enjoying particular influence. [redacted]  
[redacted]

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

6

25X1

Cuba - UN Trade Conference: The role Cuba is to play at the UN Conference on Trade and Development in March has apparently been coordinated with the Soviet bloc Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).

25X1

[REDACTED]

Cuba will act as the champion of underdeveloped countries outside the Soviet bloc. It was presumably felt that Cuba would be in a good position to advertise the attractiveness that bloc economic policies hold for underdeveloped countries.

To strengthen the Cuban case with the unaligned, it was also decided that the Cuban delegation should appear to operate independently.

Cuba could have a considerable impact on a number of important one-crop countries which have long advocated some form of international guarantees to assure stable world commodity prices. Cuba will probably point to the recently concluded USSR-Cuba sugar agreement as a model arrangement for alleviating the problem of a single-crop economy.

[REDACTED]

25X1

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

7

25X1

25X1

25X1

NOTES

Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk may be backing down from his recent threat to recognize North Vietnam and to conclude a military pact with Communist China unless a Geneva-type neutrality conference is convened by the end of May. On 18 February, he announced that South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States need not attend such a conference if they agreed to meet in Phnom Penh by the end of March for the purpose of recognizing Cambodia's neutrality and borders. If this were done, Sihanouk said Cambodia would resume diplomatic relations with South Vietnam and Thailand and would prevent the use of Cambodian territory by "rebel bands."

25X1

West Germany - Ceylon: The Bonn government is considering termination of its development aid program in Ceylon in retaliation for Colombo's recent decision to accept an East German consulate general. In making an example of the Ceylonese, the Germans are hopeful of discouraging India from following Colombo's lead. Bonn feels it would be unable to take retaliatory actions if New Delhi were to make such a move because of the large West German economic stakes in India.

25X1

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

25X1

25X6

Bolivia: A cabinet upheaval may be in the offing over the machinations of Minister of Government Ruben Julio, [redacted] who is using his post to expand his influence in rural areas. The US Embassy reports that the cabinet is in an "ugly mood" and torn by dissension over Julio's activities. President Paz is still in control of the situation, although it is possible he may threaten to resign in order to stop the wrangling. [redacted]

Chile: The Chilean Government has taken a number of steps to limit attendance at the second pro-Communist Latin American Youth Conference, scheduled to be held in Santiago next month. According to a Foreign Ministry official, all visa applications for bloc delegations have been turned down, and Cuba has been denied permission to fly in a planeload of delegates. He indicated that further steps may be taken to discourage convening the congress altogether.

25X1

25X1

Dominican Republic: Friction among the members of the ruling triumvirate could lead to a new governmental crisis in the near future. Rafael Bonnelly, a former interim president, is [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] attempting to drive a wedge between triumvirate members Donald Reid Cabral and Ramon Tapia Espinal in order to further his own political ambitions. Manuel Tavares, the other member of the triumvirate, is said to be so discouraged over the regime's difficulties that he is thinking of resigning. [redacted]

25X1

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

9

25X1

25X1

### NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

The United States Intelligence Board approved the following national intelligence estimates on 19 February 1964:

25X1

NIE 11-9-64: "Soviet Foreign Policy." [REDACTED]

NIE 89-64: "Prospects for Political Stability in Venezuela." [REDACTED]

25X1

20 Feb 64

DAILY BRIEF

10

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director



Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500200001-6

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2004/03/25 : CIA-RDP79T00975A007500200001-6

**TOP SECRET**